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I. INMODUCTONO hio workers' compensation system has been in a state of emergency
for the last two years as labor and business groups battled over a
series of employee-oriented Ohio Supreme Court decisions.1 Labor
groups hailed these decisions as the vehicle which would propel Ohio's
workers' compensation law into the twentieth century.2 Conversely,
business groups condemned the decisions asserting that they exposed
Ohio employers to infinite liability and destroyed Ohio's industrial
climate.3
The crisis peaked when business groups launched a campaign designed
to incite legislative reversal of the liberal flow of these decisions.4 When
a series of marathon hearings and negotiations failed to induce the
warring factions to arrive at an equitable settlement, the Ohio Legisla-
J. HARis, Orno WORKEs' COUPENSATION Acr 1986 SENATE B.L. 307 1 (1986).
JoINr LABsR CoM0ITTEE TO SAVE WORMERS' COMPENSATION, Tia FACTS ABouT THE ATrAcK
ON Oo WoKEase COMPENSATION 3-4, 10 (1986).
3 Id.
I J. HARRis, supra note 1, at 2.
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1987
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
ture enacted its own emergency compromise package, Amended Substi-
tute Senate Bill 307 (hereinafter S.B. 307).5
S.B. 307 has changed the face of Ohio's workers' compensation law by
revamping the definition of injury,6 establishing an intentional tort
fund,7 and creating a new intoxication defense for Ohio employers.8 The
focus of this Note is section 4123.54(B) which sets forth the skeleton of an
intoxication defense for Ohio employers by barring from compensation
those injuries which are proximately caused by the employee being
intoxicated or under the influence of a non-prescription controlled sub-
stance.9
Due to the emergent nature of S.B. 307, the Ohio Legislature failed
to define many of the legal standards set forth therein. After examin-
ing the historical development of the law of workers' compensation
and the intoxication defenses of other jurisdictions, this Note will define
the burden which befalls an Ohio employer who attempts to establish
that his employee was intoxicated or under the influence of a non-
prescription controlled substance when injured and that such conduct
was the proximate cause of the injury. The Note will also explore the
methods by which an Ohio employee can rebut his employer's in-
toxication defense.
11. A IST0oCAL PERSPECTIVE OF WoMKERS' COMPENSATION
A. Development of Workers' Compensation in the United States
Prior to the development of a statutory workers' compensation scheme
in the United States, it was estimated that seventy percent of industrial
injuries were not compensated. 10 At common law, the employee had the
nearly insurmountable burden of prosecuting his action within the scope
5 Id. at 4-5.
6 See generally §§ 4123.01(C), 4123.54, and 4123.56 of 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 307
(Baldwin). S.B. 307 has since been published in the official Oino REv. CoDo. See Ot[o REv.
CODE ANN. §§ 4123.01(C), 4123.54, 4123.56 (Page 1986).
7 See generally § 4121.80 of 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 307 (Baldwin).
8 See generally § 4123.54(B) of 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 307 (Baldwin).
9 Id.
10 W. SCHNEIDR, WORKUoNs' COMPENSATION 1 (2d ed. 1932). Cf R. DowNEY, HISTORY OF
WORK AccENTrr INDEMNITY IN IOWA 71 (1912)(83%); FIsr REPORT OF TH NEw YORK EMPLOYERS'
LumTy CoMM'N OF 1910 § 1, at 25 (1910)(87%).
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of the employer's minimal duty to exercise reasonable care" and subject
to the employer's common law defenses.12
Influenced by the heightened societal awareness of the inequities of the
common law system and the development of European compensation
systems,' 3 New York passed the United State's first statewide compen-
sation program in 1910.14 In Ohio, where it was estimated that ninety-
four percent of industrial injuries were not compensated,' 5 the General
Assembly quickly followed New York's lead by enacting the Ohio
Workers' Compensation Act in 1911.16
Best characterized as an industrial bargain,' 7 these acts were designed
to strike a balance between the interests of the employee and employer by
providing modest'8 compensation for workplace injuries without hamper-
ing industrial development. The employee was required to surrender his
common law right to sue his employer in negligence for personal injury,
pain and suffering, loss of consortium, and punitive damages in exchange
for guaranteed moderate compensation.' 9 By relinquishing his common
law defenses and subjecting himself to fixed, limited liability regardless
of fault, the employer avoided costly litigation and the prospect of a
substantial adverse judgment.20
'* The common law imposed upon the employer a minimal number of obligations to
ensure the safety of his employees. These common law duties included:
1. The duty to provide a safe workplace.
2. The duty to provide safe appliances, tools, and equipment for work.
3. The duty to give warning of dangers of which the employee might reasonably
be expected to remain in ignorance.
4. The duty to provide a sufficient number of fellow servants.
5. The duty to promulgate and enforce rules for the conduct of employees which
would make the work safe.
W. PROSSER & W. KEErO, PROSSER AND KEETON om um LAW OF Tonas § 41, at 569-70, 573-74
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEEToN].
12 At common law, the employer had three affirmative defenses which made it difficult
for an employee to recover ajudgment against him. These defenses often called the "unholy
trinity" included: (1) contributory negligence; (2) assumption of the risk; and (3) the fellow
servant doctrine. Id. at 569.
13 The first workers' compensation act was passed in Germany in 1884. 1 A. LARSON, THE
LAW OF WoEmENs' ColPENsA ioN § 510 (1975).
'4 Id.
15 REPORT or Omo E mOprs' Llsnu COMN& or 1911, 1 at xxxv-xliv (1911).
,o The Ohio Workers' Compensation Act, 102 Ohio Laws 524 (1911).
7 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 80, at 573-75.
,s The main objectives of Ohio's workers' compensation legislation were to prevent the
destitution of the injured employee, to preserve the employee's dignity, and to restore the
employee to a state of partial wholeness. See generally Industrial Comm'n v. Drake, 103
Ohio St. 628, 134 N.E. 465 (1921).
'9 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 80, at 73-75.
20 Id. See also 1 A. LARSON, supra note 13, at § 4.40.
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B. Development of Workers' Compensation in Ohio
Although an improvement over the common law system, Ohio's Work-
ers' Compensation Act was not flawless. Over a seventy-five year period,
the Ohio Supreme Court and the Ohio Legislature have grappled with the
issue of what injuries fall within the scope of the Act.21 Efforts by the
court and the legislature to resolve this issue have often met with strong
criticism from either labor groups or the business community.22 Recently,
in the case of Blankenship u. Cincinnati Milacron Chemical, Inc.,m the
Ohio Supreme Court unwittingly touched off what has become a contem-
porary civil war between labor groups and the business community.24
Blankenship was the first of a series of five landmark Ohio Supreme
Court decisions which offset the balance of Ohio's workers' compensation
scheme in favor of the employee. 25 In the 1982 Blankenship decision, the
Ohio Supreme Court held that an employee was not precluded from
bringing a civil action against his employer for intentional tortious
conduct.26 The court also ruled in State ex rel. Ramirez v. Industrial
Comm'n27 that an employee was entitled to temporary total disability
until he could return to his former position of employment. In 1983, the
Ohio Supreme Court's Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co.2 8 decision threatened to
destroy the "going and coming rule."29
In 1984, Ohio business and manufacturing interests joined forces to
alter the court's 6-1 Democratic majority in an attempt to reverse the flow
of the recent liberal decisions.30 With the election of two new Republican
21 See JoinM LABOR COMMITTEE To SAVE WORKERS' COMPENSATON, TE FACTS AOur THE
A7TAcK ON OMO WORKERS' COMPENSATION 5-7 (1986).
22 Id.
23 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572 (1982).
24 See Jonrr LABOR COmm= rEE To SAVE WORKERS' CoM!EpsATioN, Tm FACTS AOur THE
ATTACK ON OMo WORKERS' COMPENSATON 9-12, 21 (1986).
1 J. HARRIS, supra note 1, at 1.
26 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 612-13, 433 N.E.2d 572, 576-77 (1982).
27 69 Ohio St. 2d 630, 433 N.E.2d 586 (1982).
2 6 Ohio St. 3d 389, 453 N.E.2d 570 (1983).
In Littlefield, the Ohio Supreme Court awarded compensation to an employee who was
turning left into his employer's parking lot when injured. The decision carved out a special
risk exception to the "going and coming rule" based on the following two prong test: (1) the
worker must not have been at the location of the injury "but for the employment," and
(2) the risk of such injury must be distinctive in nature or quantitatively greater than the
risk common to the general public. Id. at 394, 453 N.E.2d at 575.
1 The "going and coming rule" denied compensation for injuries sustained by the
employee while traveling to and from work. These injuries were the result of personal risks
and only indirectly related to the employment. Comment, Littlefield u. Pillsbury Co.: A
Turn to the Left in Workers' Compensation Defense, 46 Omo ST. L.J. 413 (1985).
" J. HAms, supra note 1, at 2.
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justices and the Republican control of the senate, Ohio business and
manufacturing interests had just begun to fight.31
Undaunted by these tactical maneuvers, the Ohio Supreme Court
handed down two more employee-oriented decisions on December 31,
1984. Expanding upon Blankenship, Jones v. VIP Development Co.
32
defined the concept of intentional tort and held that damages awarded in
a civil suit were not to be precluded by or to be set-off against the
employee's workers' compensation benefits. Also, in Village v. General
Motors Corp.,33 the court established compensation for work-related
injuries which developed gradually over the course of employment.
Jones and Village are often assailed as being the "proverbial straw that
broke the camel's back."34 It was argued that these decisions meant
virtually "unlimited liability"3 5 for Ohio employers. In response to the
decisions, the Ohio Manufacturers' Association, assisted by the Ohio
Chamber of Commerce and other employer groups, made workers'
compensation reform its number one priority.3 6
C. Amended Substitute Senate Bill 307
The Ohio Manufacturers' Association utilized the media to induce
public pressured legislative action. The heart of their program was that
the recent Ohio Supreme Court decisions made Ohio "bad for business."
37
The propoganda induced swift legislative response in the Republican
dominated Senate where Senators Gary Suhadolnik and Richard Finan
31 Id.
32 15 Ohio St. 3d 90, 472 N.E.2d 1046 (1984).
33 15 Ohio St. 3d 129, 472 N.E.2d 1079 (1984).
' J. HARRis, supra note 1, at 3.
35 Id.
36 Id. See also JonT LABOR CousirrrEE To SAVE WoRKERs' COmPEmSAION, THE FACTS AOur
THE ATrACK ON Omo WomRsS' COMPENSATION 3 (1986).
' The Ohio Manufacturers' Association argued that unlimited liability for workplace
injuries would result in higher workers' compensation premiums and scare industry out of
Ohio. The Ohio Manufacturers' Association also asserted that this was one of the reasons
why Ohio lost the GM Saturn Plant to Tennessee. Daily News, April 29, 1985 at E2, col. 1.
However, the AFL-CIO alleged that: (1) Ohio workers' compensation scheme was not a
financial burden to industry; and (2) Ohio did not lose the GM Saturn plant due to its
workers' compensation scheme. A 1984 study by the National Council on Compensation
Insurance revealed that Ohio employers pay the 12th lowest premium rates in the nation.
In addition, Ohio provides benefits similar to those in other industrial states. Ohio's 1985
maximum average weekly wage was $345 which was similar to Michigan, $358; Kentucky,
$305; Pennsylvania, $336; West Virginia, $321; and Wisconsin, $321. Low premium rates
and good benefits will not deter business from settling in Ohio. Beacon Journal, April 14,
1985 § E2; Dispatch, May 11, 1985 at E6, col. 2.
The AFL-CIO also explained that GM chose to settle in Tennessee which is a state with
a base premium rate of only a nickel less than Ohio's ($1.63 rather than $1.68 per $100 of
payroll). Tennessee also ranks 49th in the amount of maximum average weekly wage it
allows its employees ($136). The Plain Dealer, Sept. 2, 1985 § 16A.
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1987
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introduced Senate Bill 155 (hereinafter S 155) on April 23, 1985.38
Designed to revise recent Ohio Supreme Court decisions and restore a
balance between the interests of Ohio employers and employees, S 155
accomplished nothing other than to drive labor and business interests
further apart.39
Governor Richard Celeste also failed in a valiant attempt to force labor
and management into a compromise package.40 Labor stubbornly refused
to surrender the long overdue court victories which they believed brought
the Ohio workers' compensation scheme into the twentieth century.4 1
Conversely, business continued to clamor for revision of the decisions
which they argued were destroying Ohio's industrial climate.42
With business and labor in a deadlock, the General Assembly ap-
pointed a task force in September 1985.43 However, once it became clear
that this task force would fare no better, Senator Finan and Representa-
tive Skeen independently introduced legislation (S 307 and H 73) which
sustained support only in their respective chambers. 44 A Conference
Committee failed to hammer out the differences in the bills before the
March 1986 recess. 45
During the recess, Senator Finan and Representative Skeen struck a
compromise.48 After ten months of stalemate and five additional hear-
ings, Amended Substitute Senate Bill 307 (hereinafter S.B. 307), received
the approval of both houses of the legislature by May 15, 1986.47 S.B. 307
was signed by Governor Celeste on May 23, 1986.48
Effective August 22, 1986, S.B. 307 sets the framework for reversal of
the remnants of the Ohio Supreme Court's 1982 to 1984 liberal trend.49
38 J. HAuus, supra note 1, at 3.
" Id. See also Testimony on S.B. 155 Before the Ohio Senate Ways and Means
Committee, May 28, 1985 (statement by Irwin L. Silbert, Legislative Representative, Ohio
D.R.IV.E.).
41 Since the adoption of the Ohio Workers' Compensation Act in 1911, all legislation in
the area had been obtained via an agreed bill. When revision was required, labor and
business groups met and resolved their differences. J. HARMs, supra note 1, at 3.
41 Letter from The Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers to Governor Richard Celeste
(1985)(discussing the Ohio intentional tort issue).
42 id.
" J. HARM, supra note 1, at 3.
44Id.
46 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 5.
48 Id.
"4 Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals Corp., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608,433 N.E.2d
572 (1982) and Jones v. VIP De. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 90, 472 N.E.2d 1046 (1984) were
rendered impotent by the creation of a special statutory proceeding and intentional tort
fund to replace the employee's common law action for intentional tort. See § 4121.80 of 1986
Ohio Legis. Serv. 307 (Baldwin).
A new dimension has been added to the "former position test" set forth in State ex rel.
[Vol. 35:483
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However, the crisis is not over. Due to the hurried and emergent nature
of the bill, the language dissolves many of the old legal tests which were
utilized in determining the compensability of an injury, and offers little
guidance as to the application of the new standards set forth therein. 50
The question now remaining is whether the statutory construction yet to
be offered by the new court with its Republication majority1 will send
labor and business back to the battlefield and the legislature back to the
drawing board.
The central focus of this Note is section 4123.54(B) of S.B. 307 which
provides Ohio employers with an intoxication defense, but which is silent
as to how such a defense should be established. Proposed by the United
Auto Workers (hereinafter UAW) and supported by the Teamsters as well
as the AFL-CIO at a hearing of the Senate Ways and Means Committee,
the legislation was eagerly incorporated into S.B. 307 and then forgotten
amidst the massive turmoil which surrounded many of the bill's other
major provisions.5 2
Specifically, the issues which will be addressed are twofold: (1) based
upon a careful review of the litigation surrounding the intoxication
defenses of other jurisdictions, what will be the Ohio employer's burden
with regard to the establishment of the employee's intoxication at the
time of his injury and the causal connection between the employee's
intoxication and his injury; and (2) what evidence can the employee
present to rebut an intoxication defense?
Section 4123.54(B) denies workers' compensation benefits for an injury
"caused by the employee being intoxicated or under the influence of a
controlled substance not prescribed by a physician where the intoxication
or being under the influence of a controlled substance not prescribed by
Ramirez v. Industrial Comm'n, 69 Ohio St. 2d 630, 433 N.E.2d 586 (1982). If the employee
is capable of any type of work, he is not entitled to temporary total disability benefits. If the
employer cannot find work within the capabilities of the employee, the employee must
register with the Bureau of Employment Services which will assist him in finding suitable
employment. See § 4123.56 of 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 307 (Baldwin).
Village v. General Motors Corp., 15 Ohio St.3d 129, 472 N.E.2d 1079 (1984) has been
altered by a provision which states that the natural deterioration of the body is not a
compensable injury. See § 4123.01(C) of 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 307 (Baldwin)
S.B. 307 does not directly address Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 389, 453
N.E.2d 570 (1983). J. HARRis, supra note 1, at 57.
60 J. Himnms, supra note 1, at 5.
51 The 1986 election resulted in a shift from a Democratic to a Republican majority on
the court. Included in this political majority are Chief Justice Thomas Moyer and Justices
Robert Holmes, Andy Douglas, and Craig Wright. Justices Herbert Brown, Ralph Locher,
and A. William Sweeney form the Democratic minority. Goostree, How New Will the New
Court Be?, 1 Omo LA~WYE 5 (1987).
2 Telephone Interview with Amy Schowalter-Newman, Legislative Aide to Senator
Finan (Feb. 5, 1987).
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1987
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a physician was the proximate cause of the injury .... ."53 When asked to
comment on the intended construction of the legal tests set forth in
section 4123.54(B), the advice of Senator Finan's office was to "let the bill
stand on its face."54 Unable to obtain guidance from the legislature, the
first step to developing a practical construction of section 4123.54(B)
requires an examination of the provision's legislative history and the
general effect of substance abuse in the workplace.
III. Tum HIoRay OF SECTON 4123.54(B)
Economic and safety considerations motivated the UAW, Teamsters,
and AFL-CIO to initiate and support the development of a statutory
intoxication defense for Ohio employers.55 In addition to the human loss
due to injury or death, employees who abuse drugs or alcohol in the
workplace collectively cost their employers billions of dollars each year.
These additional expenditures hinder the development and expansion of
industry.5 6
Recently, the Department of Health and Human Services funded a
study by the Research Triangle Institute. Their study revealed that in
1980 drug abuse throughout the nation cost the employer $25.7 billion,
while alcohol abuse cost nearly double at $50.6 billion.57 The employers'
costs can be attributed to one or more of the following alcohol or
drug-induced problems: lost productivity, quality control problems, re-
placement and training of new employees, absenteeism, low morale, poor
decision making, medical expenses, death claims, injury claims, and
workplace theft. 8
In terms of safety and human loss, the Employee Assistance Society of
North America estimates that alcoholics are at a two to three times
greater risk of being involved in an industrial accident than non-
alcoholics.5 9 They also submit that alcohol abuse has been linked to forty
53 See § 4123.54(B) of 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 307 (Baldwin).
" Telephone Interview with Amy Schowalter-Newman, Legislative Aide to Senator
Finan (Feb. 5, 1987).
" Id. See Angola, Drug Testing in the Workplace: Is it Legal?, 1985 PERSOMNEL
ADmNISTRATOR 79.
" See Angola, supra note 55, at 79.
57 The Plain Dealer, Oct. 5, 1986 § 1E.
58 See Angola, supra note 55, at 79. See generally Dugan, Affirmative Action For
Alcoholics & Addicts?, 5 EMPLOMrENT RELATiONS L.J. 235,238 (1979); Geidt, Drug & Alcohol
Abuse in the Workplace: Balancing Employer & Employee Rights, 11 EMPLomYmsrr RELATIlNS
L.J. 181 (1985); Susser, Legal Issues Raised by Drugs in the Workplace, 36 LAn. L.J. 42-43
(1985).
69 From Baseball Diamond to Shop Floor: Employees Battling AlcohollDrug Abuse,
DAILY LABoR REPoRT (BNA) No. 211, at C-1, C-2 (Oct. 31, 1985).
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percent of industrial fatalities and forty-seven percent of industrial
injuries.60
Section 4123.54(B) which empowers Ohio employers with the ability to
invoke an intoxication defense provides the Industrial Commission, and
ultimately the court, with grounds for denying compensation to the
employee whose use of drugs or alcohol is the proximate cause of the
injury.61 The prospect of losing his workers' compensation benefits will
undoubtedly deter the employee from abusing drugs or alcohol in the
workplace. If the statute is a successful deterrent, the cost of substance
abuse to the employer, and ultimately to society,62 will be reduced.
IV. PROVING THAT THE EMPLOYE WAS "INTOXICATED" OR
"UNDER THE INFLUENCE"
The first element of an Ohio employer's intoxication defense requires
the employer to show that the employee was intoxicated or under the
influence of a controlled substance not prescribed by a physician when
injured.63 To sustain his burden of proof, the employer must understand
what constitutes intoxication or being under the influence.
The legislature's silence on this matter forces the employer to examine
the standards and definitions utilized in other areas, for instance the
litigation in Ohio drunk driving cases. In State v. Steele,64 it was
determined that the accused must have consumed some intoxicating
beverage in such quantity that it adversely affected his actions and
reactions, and deprived him of that clearness of intellect and control
which he would otherwise possess. A consistent theme in such definitions
is the effect of the alcohol on the defendant's brain and reflexes. This
author finds it helpful to conceptualize intoxication or under the influ-
ence as: the physical state in which alcohol or a non-prescription
controlled substance has had such an effect on the employee's nervous
system, brain, or muscles as to impair the employee's ability to perform
his job in a manner as would an ordinary prudent person in full
possession of his faculties and using reasonable care under similar
60 Id.
61 See § 4123.54 of 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 307 (Baldwin).
62 Summarized by the old adage, "the cost of the product should bear the blood of the
workman," industrial injuries are treated as a cost of production. PRossEa & KEmN, supra
note 11, § 80, at 573.
Built into the cost of any product is the cost of premiums for workers' compensation
coverage or self-insurance. It is in this manner that the cost of the injury is spread
throughout society. J. YOUNG, WoPmw.Ns' COMPENSATO LAW OF OMo §1.12 (2d ed. 1984 Supp.
1985).
63 See § 4123.54(B) of 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 307 (Baldwin).
" 95 Ohio App. 107, 117 N.E.2d 617 (1952).
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1987
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:483
circumstances. 65 Arguably, this state is reached prior to the employee
being so inebriated or high that he can no longer engage in his
employment.66
However, based on this definition, a difficult question arises as to what
type and quantity of evidence will be sufficient to establish that the
employee is intoxicated or under the influence.
A. Evidence of Intoxication
In the litigation of drunk driving cases, observed evidence offered by
lay or expert testimony is admissible on the issue of intoxication.6 7 Such
evidence often includes testimony by police officers regarding the defen-
dant's erratic driving, alcoholic breath, flushed face, slurred speech,
staggering gait, and inability to perform sobriety tests.6s When offered in
various combinations, the following observations by supervisors and
co-employees have been considered probative of intoxication in the
workers' compensation setting: the employee's reputation as a heavy
drinker, possession of a partially filled liquor bottle, and the fact that the
employee had a few drinks.6 9 More recently, the same observed evidence
admissible in a drunk driving case has been held to be evidence of
intoxication sufficient to justify drug and alcohol testing in the work-
place. 70
The employer can bolster these physical and behavioral observations
with biochemical test results. In descending order of accuracy, tests of the
employee's blood, breath, saliva, and urine can be utilized to determine
the alcohol level in his system.7 ' Evidence of the employee's blood alcohol
level has been held admissible on the issue of intoxication in workers'
compensation claims in Ohio and many other jurisdictions.72
I See L. TAYLOR, DRUNK DRIVnWG DEFENSE 26-27 (1986). See also Omo REv. CoDE ANN.
§ 3720.01(C)(Baldwin 1972).
66 Arthur Larson opposes the application of a stringent intoxication test. To illustrate
his point, he quotes the popular quatrain:
He is not drunk who from the floor
Can rise again and drink some more;
But he is drunk who prostrate lies
And cannot drink and cannot rise.
Larson, Intoxication as a Defense in Workmens' Compensation, 59 CORNL L RV. 399
(1974). See also infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
67 L. TAYLOR, supra note 65, at 28.
6 Id.
r" Larson, supra note 66, at 398-99.
70 See Ass'n of Western Pulp & Paper Works v. Boise Cascade Corp., 644 F. Supp. 183
(D. Or. 1986). See also infra note 114 and accompanying text.
71 See generally R. Willette, Testing Employers for Alcohol and Drugs (Cuyahoga Bar
Association's Worker's Compensation Seminar Oct. 17, 1986).
72 See generally Phelps v. Positive Action Tool Co., 26 Ohio St. 3d 142, 497 N.E.2d 969
(1986). See generally infra note 84.
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For guidance in drawing legal presumptions from the biochemical test
results, the employer can analogize to the Driving While Intoxicated
Statutes (hereinafter DWI statutes). Most states have patterned their
statutes on the Uniform Vehicle Code which presumes intoxication at a
blood level of 0.10%.7 3 In Ohio, the Revised Code provides that no person
shall operate any vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley if that person has
a blood alcohol level of 0.10% or more.7 4
These "per se" statutes are based on studies of the clinical symptoms
which commonly accompany various levels of blood alcohol in the average
person.75 These studies have divided intoxication into various stages. At
the Subclinical Stage, a person with a blood alcohol level of 0 to 0.11%
appears normal with slight changes detectable only with performance
tests. 76 In the Emotional Instability Stage, a person with a blood alcohol
level of 0.09 to 0.21% shows a decrease in inhibition, emotional instabil-
ity, slight muscular incoordination, and a slowing of responses to stim-
uli.77 A person with disturbed sensation, decreased pain sense, staggering
gait, slurred speech, and a blood alcohol level of 0.18 to 0.33% is in the
Confusion Stage.78 With a blood alcohol level of 0.27 to 0.43%, a person
has entered the Stupor Stage and shows a marked decrease in response to
stimuli and muscular incoordination which approaches paralysis.79 Blood
alcohol levels of 0.36 to 0.56% have been designated as the Coma Stage
which is accompanied by complete loss of consciousness, depressed
reflexes, impaired circulation, and possible death.8 0 Without medical
intervention, death is likely to ensue at a blood alcohol level greater than
0.44%.81
It can be argued that in many types of employment an employee in the
Emotional Instability Stage 2 may be a danger to himself and others.
Emotional instability and decreased inhibition can cause the employee to
lose his sense of caution and, if accompanied by slight incoordination and
a slowed response time, may increase the risk that the employee or others
will be injured on the job.
Despite the legal presumptions which have arisen from the biochemical
tests in the area of drunken driving, a blood alcohol level at or above the
presumptive level does not by itself establish intoxication in the workers'
s UNIFORM VEMCLE CoDE § 11.902.1 (Supp. 1983).
4 OtIo Rv. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (Baldwin 1983).
7r A. HAHN, R. BARim & S. OFsmnicm, PiHAHiACOLOGY IN NumSG 179-80 (1982)
[hereinafter HAm & BAwml. See generally L. TAYLOR, supra note 65, at 26-31.
76 HAHN & BAiaN, supra note 75, at 180.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
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compensation setting. 3 For example, compensation has been granted in
the following states despite the fact that the employee's blood alcohol
level was above the presumption established by the DWI statutes:
Alabama (0.17%), Colorado (0.195%), Florida (0.22%), Illinois (0.186%),
Indiana (0.11%), Iowa (0.147%), Missouri (0.17%), Montana (0.34%), New
Jersey (0.163%), New York (0.215%), Oregon (0.18%), Pennsylvania
(0.285%), South Carolina (0.212%), Tennessee (0.11%), Virginia (0.227%),
and Washington (0.28%).84 These courts justified their decisions as
follows: (1) the employer failed to sustain his burden on the issue of
intoxication because he either did not account for the effect on the
individual's tolerance level or there was a discrepancy in the testing
procedures; (2) the employer satisfied his burden with regard to intoxi-
cation, but failed to establish the requisite causal connection between the
employee's intoxication and his injury; or (3) the employer was stopped
from asserting an intoxication defense because he acquiesced in or
encouraged the employee to drink.8
5
8 There is no predetermined number above which compensation will invariably be
denied, and below which compensation will be awarded. Larson, supra note 66, at 401.
8 See Loftis v. Clift Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., No. 265, slip. op. (Sup. Ct. Tenn. June 23,
1986)(WESTLAW, Tennessee cases file)(employer failed to account for individual tolerance
levels to alcohol and failed to prove employee was intoxicated in course of employment);
Chandler v. Suitt Constr. Co., 288 S.C. 503, 343 S.E.2d 633 (1986); American Safety Razor
Co. v. Hunter, 2 Va. App. 258, 343 S.E.2d 461 (1986)(sudden movement of forklift not
intoxication caused employee to fall); Swillum v. Empire Gas Transp., Inc., 698 S.W.2d 921
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985)(truck driver engaged in employment despite intoxication); Oakes v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 79 Pa. Commw. 454, 469 A.2d 723 (1984) (intoxi-
cated employee would have hit witness if he swerved to avoid collision); West Fla. Distrib.
v. Laramie, 438 So. 2d 133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)(employer who acquiesced in and
encouraged employee to drink with customers was estopped from asserting defense);
Flavorland Indus., Inc. v. Schumaker, 32 Wash. App. 428, 647 P.2d 1062 (1982)(employer
paid for employee to entertain buyers after weekly meeting); International Ass'n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Industrial Comm'n, 79 III. 2d 544, 404 N.E.2d 787
(1980)(employee engaged in business despite intoxication); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.
v. Willis, 401 N.E.2d 87 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)(employee taking medication prescribed by
physician for previous work-related injury); Hawk v. Jim Hawk Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 282
N.W.2d 84 (Iowa 1979)(rain and fog was proximate cause of accident and subsequent
injury); Steffes v. 93 Leasing Co., 177 Mont. 83, 580 P.2d 450 (1978(co-employee's
intoxication caused accident); Lankford v. Redwing Carriers, Inc., 344 So. 2d 515 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1977)(coroner was not statutorily authorized to withdraw specimen); Loucks v. Joy
Automatics, 54 A.D.2d 1037, 388 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1976)(intoxication not the sole cause of
employee's injury); Flowers v. SAIF, 17 Or. App. 189, 521 P.2d 363 (1974)(traveling
salesman engaged in business despite intoxication); Electric Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 154 Colo. 491, 391 P.2d 677 (1964)(proximato cause of injury was
mechanical failure of car); Olivera v. Hatco Chem. Co., 55 N.J. Super. 336, 150 A.2d 781
(1959)(intoxication not the sole cause of employee's injury).
" See generally supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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In addition to showing that an Ohio employee had a blood alcohol level
of 0.10% when injured,86 the aforementioned decisions suggest that the
Ohio employer should present other evidence which is probative on the
issue of intoxication. Such evidence might include expert medical testi-
mony regarding the clinical symptoms which would have accompanied
the employee's blood alcohol level;87 evidence of the effect of individual
tolerance levels on the clinical symptoms which would have accompanied
the employee's blood alcohol level;88 the employee's probable blood
alcohol level at the time of his injury;89 and the effect of the employee's
past medical history on the test results or his tolerance for alcohol.90 If
available, the employer should also present lay testimony regarding the
circumstances surrounding the injury;9 1 the type of work the employee
was engaged in when injured;92 the employee's performance prior to
injury;9 3 and the employee's behavior, physical condition, and attendance
record prior to the injury.94 The employer should also consider presenting
86 See Oino REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (Baldwin 1983).
s See generally Phelps v. Positive Action Tool Co., 26 Ohio St.3d 142, 145, 497 N.E.2d
969,971 (1986); American Safety Razor Co., 2 Va. App. at 265,343 S.E. 2d at 464; West Fla.
Distrib., 438 So. 2d at 134; Garcia v. City of Albuquerque, 99 N.M. 746, 663 P.2d 1203
(1983); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Silas, 631 S.W. 2d 551,552 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); Davis
v. C&M Tractor Co., 627 S.W.2d 561 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982); Joseph Seagram & Sons, Inc., 401
N.E.2d at 89; Inscoe v. DeRose Indus., Inc., 30 N.C. App. 1, 226 N.E. 2d 201 (1976); Electric
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 154 Colo. at 491, 391 P.2d at 679; Smith v. Sunshine Mining Co., 72
Idaho 8, 15, 236 P.2d 87, 93 (1951).
11 American SafetyRazorCo., 2 Va. App. at 264, 343 S.E.2d at 463 (physician evaluated
effect of alcoholism on person's tolerance for blood alcohol level of 0.227%); West Fla.
Distrib., 438 So. 2d at 133-34 (physician testified that even if employee had a greater than
average tolerance level, blood alcohol of 0.22% would have dulled his reflexes and
diminished his ability to drive).
89 See American Safety.Razor Co., 2 Va. App. at 205,343 S.E.2d 464; West Fla. Distrib.,
438 So. 2d at 134; Electric Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 154 Colo. at 491, 391 P.2d at 679.
90 SeeAmerican SafetyRazor Co., 343 S.E.2d at 463 (employee was an alcoholic); Garcia,
99 N.M. at 746, 663 P.2d at 1203 (employee had back problem and history of alcoholism);
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 401 N.E.2d at 87 (compensation awarded to an employee
taking valium and librium for a prior work-related injury where employee died from the
combined effect of drugs and alcohol).
91 See generally Phelps, 26 Ohio St. 3d at 142-43,497 N.E.2d at 969; United Pac. Ins. Co.
v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); Driscoll v. Great Plains Mktg. Co., 322
N.W.2d 478,479 (S.D. 1982); Loucks v. Jay Automatics, 54, A.D. 2d 1037,388 N.Y.S. 2d 378
(1976); Inscoe v. DeRose Indus., Inc., 30 N.C. App. 1,226 S.E.2d 201 (1976); Olivera v. Hatco
Chem. Co., 55 N.J. 336, 150 A.2d 779,783-85 (1959); Sunshine Mining Co., 72 Idaho at 125,
236 P.2d at 92.
92 Id.
93 Id.
g' J. Gecht, E. Casper, & R. Kaplan, Controlled Substances: Use, Abuse, and Effects
(Cuyahoga County Bar Association's Workers' Compensation Seminar Oct. 17, 1986).
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expert industrial testimony regarding what the employee's job entailed
and how the injury may have occurred. 95
B. Evidence of Being Under the Influence
Nine states,98 including Ohio,97 have incorporated into their intoxica-
tion defenses a denial of compensation for those injuries caused by the
employee's use of non-prescription controlled substances. A controlled
substance is a "drug, compound, mixture, preparation, or substance"98
included in Schedules I through V of the Ohio Revised Code.99 If the
employees tests positively for any of the over two hundred drugs in
Schedule I through V,100 he may be under the influence of a controlled
substance not prescribed by a physician. Section 4123.54(B) is silent on
the question of whether a trace of a controlled substance or a particular
blood level will be reqired.0o Ohio's DWI statute affords the employer
no guidance because it simply states that no person shall operate a
vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley if that person is "under the
influence of alcohol or any drug of abuse, or the combined influence of
alcohol and any drug of abuse."'10 2
Discerning what evidence will be probative of "being under the
influence" is difficult when some jurisdictions refuse to recognize an
intoxication defense which is based upon the employee's use of a non-
prescription controlled substance. In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v.
Silas,0 3 the court held that because the statute granting the employer an
intoxication defense did not explicitly include drugs, the employee could
not be precluded from recovering his workers' compensation benefits.
However, studies have indicated that much of the same type of observed
evidence admissible in proving intoxication is probative of being under
the influence as well. Such evidence includes slurred speech, incoordina-
tion, staggering gait, flushing of the skin, sniffing, and drowsiness. 10 4
Drug abusers may also have needle marks on their bodies.105
In terms of biochemical testing, the following levels of commonly used
controlled substances have been suggested as per se evidence of being
9 Olivera, 55 N.J. at. 342-43, 150 A.2d. at 784-85.
9 See ALsrKi STAT. § 23.30.235 (1982); COrN. GEN. STAT. § 31-275 (1969); FLA. STAT. ArN.
§ 440.09 (West 1937); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44.501 (1975); MD. Amr. CODE art. 101, § 15 (1972);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02 (1960); § 4123.54(B) of 1986 Ohio
Legis. Serv. 307 (Baldwin); R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-33-2 (1982).
97 See § 4123.54(B) of 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 307 (Baldwin).
9 Omo Rzv. CODE ANN. § 3719.01(D)(Baldwin 1977).
g Owo Rzv. CODE ANN. § 3719.01(FF)(Baldwin 1977).
1O Id.
101 See § 4123.54(B) of 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 307 (Baldwin).
102 Omo REv. CODE Am'. § 4511.19 (Baldwin 1983).
103 631 S.W.2d 551 ('rex. Ct. App. 1982).
104 See generally R. Willette, supra note 71.
105 Id.
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under the influence: blood levels of marijuana at 5 ng/ml, serum levels of
cocaine at 200 ng/ml, blood levels of phenycycidine at 25 ng/ml, serum
levels of codeine at 50 ng/ml, serum levels of heroin at 25 ng/ml, serum
levels of morphine at 25 ng/ml, plasma levels of methadone at 100 ng/ml,
blood levels of methaqualone at 2,000 ng/ml, and plasma levels of
barbiturates at 1,000 at 4,000 ng/ml. 10  These levels are based on studies
of the clinical symptoms which accompany various blood levels of these
controlled substances in the average person.10 7 As in the case of alcohol,
a blood level of a controlled substance at or above these presumptive
levels will probably not by itself establish that the employee was under
the influence when injured. If the blood level was "per se" evidence of
being under the influence, an employee who had used a drug which stays
in the body for several weeks would test positive and possibly be denied
compensation despite the fact that he was not under the influence when
injured.
To be consistent with section 4123.95 which requires that Ohio
workers' compensation legislation be construed liberally in favor of the
employee, 0 8 the Ohio employer's burden should not be satisfied by
merely presenting the results of a blood test. Blood tests are but one piece
of evidence to be considered in the totality of the circumstances surround-
ing the injury.10 9 Instead, the employer should present lay and expert
testimony on the same issues discussed in regard to intoxication.
C. Drug Testing in the Workplace
Ohio employers may wish to establish drug testing programs in their
workplaces to facilitate obtaining biochemical test results which can be
presented in conjunction with other evidence of the employee's intoxica-
tion or being under the influence. Presently drug testing in the workplace
is gaining national attention. More than one quarter of all Fortune 500
companies perform drug testing on their employees.' 10 However, such
testing raises major concerns among civil libertarians including privacy
rights, due process violations, and unreasonable search and seizure.,
Employers interested in establishing a drug testing program to facili-
tate testing of their employees for workers' compensation and general
employment purposes can model theirs after the Boise Cascade Corp.
(hereinafter Boise).1 2 Three groups of employees are tested: (1) those
106 Id.
107 Id.
109 Oio Rlv. CODE Arm. § 4123.95 (Baldwin 1959).
109 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
110 Rust, Drug Testing: The Legal Dilemma, 1986 A.B.A.J. 51.
I d.
112 See Ass'n of Western Pulp & Paper Worker v. Boise Cascade Corp., 644 F. Supp. 183
(D. Or. 1986).
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whom the supervisors have reasonable cause to believe are under the
influence of alcohol or an illegal drug; (2) those who suffer an injury on
the job which requires medical attention beyond first aid; and (3) all those
involved in the accident, but not injured. 1 3 The following signs are
sufficient to give a supervisor reasonable cause to have the employee
tested: alcohol on the breath, lapses in performance, inability to appro-
priately respond to questions, and physical signs of drug or alcohol
abuse. 114 If the employee refuses testing or the test shows that he was
intoxicated or under the influence of an illegal drug, the employee is
subject to immediate suspension and possible discharge. 11
Presently, the major obstacle to the Boise program is the Union which
alleges that the Boise program violates the employee's common law right
to privacy and constitutes a breach of Boise's contract with the Union. 116
However, the Oregon district court recognized that a company involved in
a union contract retains the right to institute reasonable work rules. 117
The court held that if the Union wishes to challenge the reasonableness
of Boise's work rules, then it must do so through arbitration. 118
Given the enthusiastic support of section 4123.54(B) by the UAW,
Teamsters, and AFL-CIO, it may be easier for Ohio employers to
establish drug testing programs. Ohio employers can attempt to circum-
vent the Boise problems by soliciting union support in the early planning
stages of their project. This Note will not address the constitutional
implications of drug testing in the workplace; however, such programs
may be challenged on constitutional grounds by employees alleging that
their rights to privacy and equal protection are being violated." 9
V. THE CAUSAL CoNNEcoN
After proving that the employee was intoxicated or under the influ-
ence, the employer must establish the second element of his defense-the
causal connection between the employee's conduct and his injury.120 All
50 states provide the employer with an intoxication defense: siX12 ' have
13 Id. at 184.
114 Id.
I's Id.
11"6 Id. at 185.
127 Id.
118 Id. at 186.
119 Note, Workers, Drinks, and Drugs: Can Employers Test?, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 127
(1986).
120 J. HARMs, supra note 1, at 102.
121 See Swillum v. Empire Gas Transport, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 921 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985);
Flavorland Indus., Inc. v. Schumaker, 647 P.2d 1062 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982); International
Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Industrial Comm'n, 79 Ill. 2d 544, 404 N.E. 2d
787 (1980); Steffes v. 93 Leasing Co., 177 Mont. 83, 580 P.2d 450 (1978); Simons v. SWF
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common law defenses and forty-four 122 have statutory defenses. The tests
utilized by these jurisdictions to establish the employee's intoxication or
the influence of drugs as the cause of his injury vary.
In those states where intoxication or being under the influence has
been recognized without special statutory provision, an "abandonment of
the employment" test is utilized.12 3 The underlying theory of this test is
that when the employee becomes so intoxicated that he is incapable of
engaging in his employment or an incident natural thereto, he has
abandoned his employment.'2 4 Any injury sustained thereafter does not
arise out of and in the course of his employment, and is not compen-
sable.125
Although the test is not conceptually complicated, denial of compensa-
tion is not the rule. In these common law jurisdictions, intoxication which
does not prevent the employee from engaging in his occupational duties
is not sufficient to defeat the causal connection between the employee's
injury and his employment even where the intoxication was a contribut-
ing factor. 26 The employee is often deemed to be engaged in his
employment when he acts at his employer's direction or in furtherance of
his employer's business, especially if his employer encourages or finances
the employee's attendance at functions which expose the employee to an
atmosphere which allows the employee to become intoxicated.
2 7
Plywood Co., 552 P.2d 268 (Or. Ct. App. 1976); Pottinger v. Industrial Cornm'n, 22 Ariz.
App. 389, 527 P.2d 1232 (1975).
122 AIA. CODE § 25-5-51 (1973); ALAsKA STAT. § 23.30.235 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 81-1324 (1976); CAL. LABOR CODE § 3600 (West 1971); COLO. REV. STAT. § 81-13-4 (1953);
CONN. GEN. STAT. Anm. § 31-275 (West 1969); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 19 § 2353(b) (1953); FLA.
STAT. § 440.09(3)(1966); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-16 (1933); HAwAn REv. STAT. § 386-3 (1969);
IDAHO CODE § 72-208 (1973); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-8 (Burns 1971); IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.16
(West 1939); KAN. SrAT. ANN. § 44.501 (1964); Ky. REv. STAT. § 342.015(3)(1916); LA. Rsv.
STAT. ANr. § 81-1324 (West 1964) tit. 23; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 39 § 61 (1965); Mn. ANN.
CODE art. 101 § 15 (1972); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 152 § 27 (1935); MICH. Comp. LAws § 412.2
(1948); MIn. STAT. ANN. § 176.021 (West 1984); Miss. STAT. ANN. § 6998-04 (West 1966); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 48-127 (1960); NEv. REv. STAT. § 616-565 (1967); N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 281:15
(1966); N.J. REv. STAT. ANi. § 34:15-7 (West 1959); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-28(B)(1978); N.Y.
WommsENi's Comi. LAw § 10 (McKinney 1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1975); N.D. CErT.
CODE § 65-01-02 (1960); § 4123.54(B) of the 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 307 (Baldwin); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 85 § 11 (1970); Pa. Workmen's Comp. Act. § 301(a) (1915); RI. GENt. LAWS
§ 28-33-2 (1968); S.C. CODs ANN. § 42-9-60 (Law Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODFID LAws ANN.
§ 62-4-37 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-110(b)(1966); Tax. R. Cv. P. ANN. 8309 (Vernon
1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-14 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 649 (1967); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 65.1-7 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-2 (1973); WLs. STAT. § 102.58 (1973); Wyo. STAT.
§ 27-12-101 (1977).
12 Larson, supra note 66, at 403. See also supra note 100.
124 Larson, supra note 66, at 403.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Flavorland Indus., Inc. v. Schumaker, 647 P.2d 1062-63 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982)(em-
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The difficulty of maintaining an intoxication defense in such jurisdic-
tion is demonstrated in the following situations: (1) a Missouri truck
driver was granted compensation for injuries when he lost control of his
truck despite the fact that he drank twelve sixteen ounce cans of beer the
evening before, his blood alcohol level was 0.17%, and he had overloaded
his truck with propane;128 (2) dependents of a Washington employee who
was attending a weekly meeting with local livestock buyers at the
direction of his employer and was killed in a car accident were awarded
compensation despite the fact that the employee had been drinking with
the buyers and had a blood alcohol level of 0.28%;129 (3) an Illinois union
official attending a series of hearings and negotiations at the direction of
his employer was granted compensation even though he had been
drinking with several other officials, had a blood alcohol level of 0.186%,
and was injured when he drove into a truck equipped with a large,
flashing yellow light;130 (4) an Arizona employee who was assigned to
host an out of town convention and was severly burned as he attempted
to light a cigarette did not abandon his employment simply because he
was intoxicated; 131 and (5) the dependents of an Oregon car salesman
were awarded compensation when he was killed returning home in a
company car after drinking at a business meeting held in a bar.132
However, the intoxication defense in jurisdictions which utilize an
"abandonment of the employment" test can be effective. An Oregon
employee was denied compensation despite the fact that he had been
drinking at an employer-sponsored meeting where alcohol was provided
by the employer because the employee continued to drink after the
meeting and was killed while driving randomly around the downtown
area.133 If the employee had been returning home from the meeting when
he sustained the accident, especially if he had been driving a company
car, compensation may have been awarded to his dependents.
Prior to the enactment of section 4123.54(B), Ohio employers utilized
the "abandonment of the employment" test in establishing an intoxica-
tion defense. 134 In White v. Yaple, 135 an employee who had been drinking
died of heatstroke while digging manholes. The court of common pleas
held that the employee's intoxication was irrelevant because the em-
ployer encouraged and paid for employee to entertain local livestock buyers after weekly
meetings).
128 Swillum v. Empire Gas Transp., Inc., 698 S.W. 2d 921 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
129 Flavorland Indus., Inc., 647 P.2d at 1062-63.
1. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Industrial Comm'n, 79
1I1.2d 544, 404 N.E.2d 787 (1980).
"'1 Pottinger v. Industrial Comm'n, 22 Ariz. App. 389, 527 P.2d 1232 (1975).
112 Simons v. SWF Plywood Co., 552 P.2d 268 (Or. Ct. App. 1976).
133 Seidl v. Dick Niles, Inc., 18 Or. App. 332, 525 P.2d 198 (1974).
134 See infra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.
135 23 Ohio N.P. 217 (1920).
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ployee died in the course of his employment.136 Similarly, in City Fuel &
Ice Co. v. Karlinsky, 37 the court of appeals held that when an intoxicated
employee returning from delivering a load of coal was thrown from the
wagon as the wheel hit a hole in the road, the employee's subsequent
injury occurred in the course of his employment. Consistent with these
early decisions is Martin v. Bernard Co.1 3s where the court held that an
intoxicated employee who ran off the road and into a guardrail while
returning the company truck two hours after the completion of his work
was not outside the scope of his employment.
The Ohio Supreme Court has denied compensation to intoxicated
employees based on the "abandonment of the employment" test. In
Stephens v. Young,139 the court held that a salesman who parked his
employer's truck and visited a tavern abandoned his employment. The
employee did not re-enter his employment when he later accepted a ride
with a stranger to a nearby town to pick up his route book and was
assaulted.140 In Ruddy v. Industrial Comm'n,141 a salesman who stopped
to buy cigarettes and had two beers was not in the course of his
employment when he was hit by a car as he crossed the street.
In 1986, the Ohio Legislature adopted a statutory intoxication defense
for Ohio employers.142 Phelps v. Positive Action Tool Co.143 is the Ohio
Supreme Court decision which marks the transition. Three days prior to
the Phelps decision, S.B. 307 providing the statutory intoxication
defense took effect. 4 4 Attempting to bridge the gap between the old law
and the new law, the Ohio Supreme Court decided Phelps based upon
the old common law standards, while incorporating some language from
the new proximate cause test set forth in section 4123.54(B).145
After work one evening, Phelps, a foreman for Positive Action Tool Co.
(hereinafter PATCO), went to a bar while on call and drank and
socialized until midnight. 146 Phelps was then summoned back to work.
On his way to PATCO, he stopped at a drilling site and socialized for
another hour. Upon resuming his trip to PATCO, Phelps' truck ran off
the road into a ditch. The evidence before the court included: Phelps'
136 Id. at 221.
137 33 Ohio App. 42, 168 N.E. 475 (1929).
13' No. 3819, slip op. at 5 (Lorain App. June 26, 1985) (WESTLAW, Ohio cases file).
139 115 Ohio App. 13, 184 N.E.2d 112 (1961).
140 Id. at 17, 184 N.E.2d at 114.
141 153 Ohio St. 475, 92 N.E. 2d 673 (1950).
142 See § 4123.54(B) of 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 307 (Baldwin).
143 26 Ohio St. 3d 142, 497 N.E.2d 969 (1986).
144 See § 4123.54(B) of 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 307 (Baldwin).
141 See generally, Phelps v. Positive Action Tool Co., 26 Ohio St. 3d 142, 497 N.E. 2d 969
(1986).146 Id. at 142-44, 497 N.E.2d at 969.
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blood alcohol level of 0.21%, the fact that no skid marks were left at the
scene, Phelps' statement to the police that he could not remember the
accident, Phelps's statement to a physician that he fell asleep at the
wheel, and Phelps' later allegation that his tire blew and was the cause
of the accident.147
The Ohio Supreme Court denied Phelps' claim for workers' compensa-
tion because his voluntary intoxication was "tantamount to abandon-
ment of his employment."148 Phelps' injury was in effect, deemed to not
arise out of and in the course of his employment, and as such the requisite
causal connection between his employment and his injury did not exist.149
The Ohio Supreme Court determined the issue of intoxication by
considering biochemical test results, observed evidence, and expert
testimony. 50 The court then applied the old common law "abandonment
of the employment" test to ascertain whether there was causal connection
between Phelps' intoxication and his injury.151 Not until the end of the
opinion did the court attempt to apply section 4123.54(B) by adding some
proximate cause language.
Although not inconsistent with section 4123.54(B) of S.B. 307, Phelps is
limited by the facts to situations in which the evidence shows the
employee is so intoxicated that he no longer could be considered engaged
in his employment or an incident natural thereto when injured.152 It can
be argued that some employees are capable of engaging in their employ-
ment until they are so intoxicated that they have reached the Confusion
or Stupor Stage with a blood alcohol level of 0.18 to 0.33% or 0.27
to 0.43%, respectively. 153 However, in light of the staggering costs of drug
and alcohol abuse in the workplace, 5 4 it is unreasonable to surmise that
the legislature intended an intoxication defense bar compensation only
when the employee is so intoxicated that he could no longer engage in his
employment. To be an effective deterrent, an intoxication defense must
also be effective against those employees who are intoxicated or under the
influence and engaged in their employ when injured.
Various standards are being utilized in other jurisdictions to establish
the causal connection between the employee's intoxication and his injury
in order to bar or reduce' 5 compensation. In those states which have a
147 Id. at 144-45, 497 N.E.2d at 969-70.
148 'Thus, we hold that under the facts of this case, Phelps' voluntary intoxication was
tantamount to his abandonment of employment and that his injury was proximately caused
by his gross state of intoxication." Id. at 145, 497 N.E.2d at 971.
149 Id.
1o d. at 144-45, 497 N.E.2d at 970-71.
1-1 Id.
1 See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
163 HAHN & BARIN, supra note 75, at 180.
's See generally supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
155 In four states, a successful intoxication defense will result in a reduction, but not a
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statutory intoxication defense, the case law with regard to causation has
developed along the following lines: (1) fourteen states and one federal
statute require that the employee's intoxication or being under the
influence be the proximate cause of the injury before compensation will
be denied; 16 6 (2) thirteen states require a simple causal connection
between the intoxication and the injury; 5 7 (3) six states and one federal
statute require that the injury be substantially or primarily occasioned
by the intoxication;I58 (4) three states deny recovery upon a mere showing
complete bar to the employee's recovery of workers' compensation. CoLO. REv. SrAT.
§ 81-13-4 (1953)(50% reduction); IDAHO CODE § 72-208 (1973)(50% reduction); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 35-1-14 (1953)(15% reduction except where death occurs); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.58
(1973)(15% reduction).
In Ohio, § 4123.54(B) of the new workers' compensation legislation provides that every
employee who is injured and the dependents of an employee who is killed in the course of
employment are entitled to workers' compensation provided that the injury was not
proximately caused by the employee's being intoxicated or under the influence of a
controlled substance not prescribed by a physician. 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 307 (Baldwin).
The provision implies that when the employee is contributorily negligent by drinking or
abusing drugs in the workplace and as a result is injured, he is not entitled to workers'
compensation.
However, in Ohio, contributory negligence is not a bar to recovery where the negligence
of defendant is fifty-one percent or greater. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Baldwin 1980).
In such a case, the plaintiff' recovery is diminished by the percent his own negligence
contributed to the harm. Id.
It is arguable that § 4123.54(B) should be construed so as to allow a similarly reduced
compensation in cases where the employee's intoxication or being under the influence
contributed to greater than fifty percent to his injuries. Cf. Note, Associated Construction
and Engineering Co. of California v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd: Comparative
Negligence in the Workers' Compensation System, 68 CALM. L. REv. 895, 901 (1980).
ii' See generally Phelps v. Positive Action Tool Co., 26 Ohio St. 3d 142, 497 N.E.2d 969
(1986); Harrell v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 316 N.C. 191, 340 S.E.2d 111 (1986); Theorin v.
Dilec Corp., 377 N.W. 437 (Minn. 1985); Driscoll v. Great Plains Mktg. Co., 322 N.W.2d 478
(S.D. 1982); Home Indem. Co. v. White, 154 Ga. App. 211,267 S.E.2d 849 (1980); Lankford
v. Redwing Carriers, Inc., 344 So. 2d 515 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977); Petroleum Equip. v.
Lancaster, 199 So. 2d 52 (Miss. 1977); Hawk v. Jim Hawk Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 282 N.W.2d
84 (Iowa 1979); McCarty v. W.C.A.B., 12 Cal. 3d 672, 572 P.2d 617 (1974); Penn Salvage Inc.
v. Wills, 282 A.2d 613 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); Woosley v. Central Uniform Rental, 463
S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971); Smith v. Sunshine Mining Co., 72 Idaho 8, 236 P.2d 91
(1951). See also FEDERA EtPLoYsa's COtMENSAnON Acr, 5 U.S.C. § 8102 (1966); ALASKA STAT.
§ 23.30.235 (1982).
157 See generally Loftis v. Clift Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., No. 265 slip. op. (Sup. Ct. Tenn.
June 23,1986) (WESTLAW, Tennessee cases file); American Safety Razor Co. v. Hunter, 2
Va. App. 258, 343 S.E.2d 461 (1986); Alco v. Baker, 651 P.2d 266 (Wyo. 1982); Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Willis, 401 N.E.2d 87 (nd. Ct. App. 1980); Liptak v. Connecticut,
176 Conn. 320, 407 A.2d 980 (1978); Beauchesne v. David London & Co., 118 R.I. 651, 375
A.2d 920 (1977); Dribble v. Industrial Comm'n, 40 Wis. 2d 341, 161 N.W.2d 913 (1968);
Erikson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 123 N.W.2d 292 (N.D. 1963);
Martin v. City of Biddeford, 138 Me. 26, 20 A.2d 715 (1941). See also HAWAn REv. STAT.
§ 386-3 (1969); UTAH CODE ANm. § 35-1-14 (1953); VT. STAT. Arm. tit. 21 § 649 (1967).
... See generally Chandler v. Suitt Constr. Co., 288 S.C. 503,343 S.E.2d 633 (1986); Frost
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of intoxication; 6 9 (5) three states require that the intoxication be the sole
cause of the injury;6o (6) two states adopt a wilful misconduct stan-
dard;161 (7) one state requires the intoxication to be the direct cause of the
injury;162 (8) one state adopts a whole or partial causation standard;16 3
and (9) one state adopts a violation of the law standard.164
The employer whose jurisdiction requires that he merely show that the
employee was intoxicated or under the influence when injured has the
easiest burden of proof. In Texas Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Dill,165 the court
denied compensation to an intoxicated employee despite the fact that the
intoxication did not contribute to his injury. Although this type of statute
may have a strong deterrent value, it is arguably unjust because it denies
compensation for injuries which would have occurred regardless of
sobriety.- 6
A slightly more stringent burden must be sustained in those jurisdic-
tions which require that the injury be shown by a preponderance of the
evidence to be due to, caused by, or resulting from the employee's
intoxication or being under the influence.1 67 In contrast, the heaviest
burden is borne by employers whose jurisdiction requires that the
intoxication or being under the influence be the "sole cause" of the
employee's injury. Since employers in such jurisdictions seldom sustain
their burden, the intoxication defense is not an effective deterrent to
substance abuse in their workplace. A typical example of such a decision
is Olivera v. Hatco.168
In Olivera, a centrifuge operator was found nearly dead in a shed
v. Albright, 460 So. 2d 1125 (La. Ct. App. 1984); West Fla. Distrib. v. Laramie, 438 So. 2d
133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Garcia v. City of Albuquerque, 99 N.M. 746, 663 P.2d 1203
(1983); Davis v. C&M Tractor Co., 627 S.W.2d 561 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982); Woodring v. United
Sash & Door Co., 152 Kan. 413, 103 P.2d 827 (1940). See also LoNG SHOREME S AND HARBOR
WoRERS' COmENSATION AcT §§ 3(b), 20, 33 U.S.C. §§ 903(b), 920 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979).
159 See generally United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986);
Johnson v. Hahn Bros. Constr. Inc., 188 Neb. 252,196 N.W.2d 109 (1972). See also NEv. REv.
STAT. § 616-565 (1967).
160 See generally Loucks v. Joy Automatics, 54 A.D.2d 1037, 388 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1976);
Karns v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 275 Md. 1, 338 A.2d 251 (1975); Olivera v. Hatco, 55 N.J.
Super. 336, 150 A.2d 781 (1959).
161 See generally Carson's Case, 351 Mass. 406, 221 N.E.2d 871 (1966); Scroggins v.
Coming Glass Co., 382 Mich. 628, 172 N.W.2d 367 (1960).
162 See generally Bell v. J.H. Rose Trucking Co., 452 P.2d 141 (Okla. 1969).
l See generally Allison v. Brown & Horsch Insulation Co., 98 N.H. 434, 102 A.2d 493
(1953).
16 Oakes v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 79 Pa. Commw. 454, 469 A.2d 723
(1984).
165 Larson, supra note 66, at 407 (citing Texas Indem. Co. v. Dill, 42 S.W. 2d 1059
(Tex. Civ. App. 1931)).
166 Larson, supra note 66, at 407.
167 Id. at 405, 407.
168 55 N.J. Super. 336, 150 A.2d 781 (1976).
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which accommodated only himself and the machine. The operator had a
blood alcohol level of 0.163%. A piece of board from 1,000 feet outside the
shed had mysteriously found its way into the machine and broken in
two. Half of the board remained in the machine. The other half fractured
the operator's sternum and ruptured his heart before it came to rest 6 to
12 feet from the shed. The employer offered an expert who opined that
the operator in his drunken condition probably placed the board in the
machine. Nevertheless, the court granted compensation because the
employer failed to show that the intoxicated employee definitely placed
the board in the machine, thereby causing his own injury. 69
An intermediate level burden is placed on employers whose jurisdic-
tion requires that the employee's intoxication or being under the influ-
ence be the proximate cause of the employee's injury.170 Ohio is one such
jurisdiction.' 7 ' Initially, the employer in these jurisdictions must show
that the employee's conduct was the cause-in-fact of his harm.172 In
negligence actions, two tests may be utilized in determining what part
the employee's conduct played in bringing about his harm. The "but for"
test73 requires that the event would not have occurred without the act or
omission of one of the parties. If the employee's injury would not have
occurred but for his intoxication or being under the influence, then the
employee's conduct is the cause-in-fact of his harm, and his injury is not
compensable.
The "but for" test was utilized in Kentucky to deny compensation
where a truck driver with a blood alcohol of 0.25% skidded off the
road into a tree. The court held that but for the truck driver's intoxication
he would not have lost control of the truck and been injured. 74
When several contributing factors exist, the substantial factor test is
often utilized. 17 5 The substantial factor test requires that one's conduct be
a substantial factor in bringing about the harm in question. 76 Under the
substantial factor test, the employee's intoxication or being under the
influence must have been a material and substantial factor in bringing
about his injury.
The substantial factor test was applied in a South Dakota case
involving a superintendent responsible for coordinating a construction
job who drove into a bridge after a bar room meeting with a subcontrac-
tor. The contributing factors included the fact that the employee had a
169 Id. at 337-40, 150 A.2d at 782-86.
170 Larson, supra note 66, at 405.
171 See § 4123.54(B) of 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 307 (Baldwin).
172 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 41, at 264-66.
173 Id.
" Woosley v. Central Uniform Rental, 463 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971).
176 See Paossza & KErEON, supra note 11, § 41, at 267-68.
276 id.
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blood alcohol level of 0.20% at the time of the accident, and the
road was icy. After the sheriff testified that he had no difficulty driving
the same road at speeds of 30, 40 and 50 miles an hour, the court held that
the employee's intoxication was a substantial factor in bringing about the
accident. 77
Once it has been established that the employee's conduct is the
cause-in-fact of his harm, then it must be determined whether the
conduct has been so significant a cause that the employee should be
legally responsible for the consequences.17 8 The test of proximate or legal
cause is best summarized by Harry Street:
It is always to be determined on the facts of each case upon the
consideration of logic, common sense, justice, policy and
precedent.... The best use that can be made of the authorities on
proximate cause is merely to furnish illustrations of situations in
which judicious men upon careful considerations have adjudged
to be on one side of the line or the other.179
An examination of how other jurisdictions apply the proximate cause test
will assist Ohio employers in establishing their intoxication defenses
pursuant to section 4123.54(B) of S.B. 307.
When the facts present a situation where a special hazard of the
employment bears on the accident, courts have often held that intoxica-
tion or being under the influence was not the proximate cause of the
employee's injury.o80 Such a case involved an Alabama truck driver who
had a blood alcohol level of 0.17% and skidded off the road on a foggy,
wet night. Compensation was awarded because fog and rain are
conditions which constitute special hazards to traveling employees.18'
Compensation has also been awarded where both intoxication and a
hazard typical to the employment are established.182 Compensation was
awarded where an intoxicated Colorado employee required to use his own
car for out of town business was involved in an accident when his car
malfunctioned. Despite his blood alcohol of 0.195%, the court held that
the malfunction of the car was the proximate cause of the injury.183 It is
arguable that serious malfunction of a vehicle is a typical hazard of any
employment that requires traveling. Perhaps an easier example is Smith
177 Driscoll v. Great Plains Mktg. Co., 322 N.W.2d 478 (S.D. 1982).
171 See PROSSER & KEnror;, supra note 11, § 42, at 272-74.
179 1 H. SmEET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LLAnurm 110 (1906).
1SO Larson, supra note 66, at 408.
'' Lankford v. Redwing Carriers, Inc., 344 So. 2d 515 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977).
182 Larson, supra note 66, at 409.
"a Electric Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 154 Colo. 491,391 P.2d 677 (1964).
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Bros. v. Dependents of Cleveland'84 where an intoxicated employee was
killed when a log fell from a log truck. The court awarded compensation
because a typical risk inherent in the loading logs is that one might fall
and injure the person loading them.
It has also been held that employers who furnish their employees with
defective equipment may expect such employees to work with it.185 Thus,
when an employee who is intoxicated or under the influence is injured by
the defective equipment, his conduct arguably is not the proximate cause
of the injury.
Many jurisdictions have held that the intoxication which caused the
employee's injury must be his own and not that of a co-employee or third
party.186 Thus, a Georgia mover who drank vodka while on the road with
the company truck driver was awarded compensation for injuries sus-
tained in an accident despite the fact that the driver's blood alcohol level
was 0.26%.187
Conversely, some jurisdictions relieve the employer of responsibility
for the employee's injury if the employee's intoxication or being under
the influence created a risk of harm which the employer could not
foresee.1 88 An intoxicated North Carolina deliveryman who drove
through a stop sign into a fire hydrant was denied compensation because
his intoxication created the harm.18 9 A drunken Minnesota employee
who lay down on a shearing machine and accidentally activated it
causing it to clamp down on her legs was denied compensation. 190
Finally, an intoxicated Louisiana employee was denied compensation
when he inadvertently amputated three fingers while operating a radial
saw which was in perfect working order. 19 1
In light of these recent decisions from other jurisdictions, Ohio
employers have no concrete standard to guide them in their attempt to
sustain an intoxication defense. Their burden is raised by the fact that
courts are reluctant to deny compensation except in cases where the
employer has clearly established'92 the causal connection between the
employee's intoxication or being under the influence. 93 Thus, it is
184 Larson, supra note 66, at 409 (citing Smith Bros. v. Dependents of Cleveland, 240
Miss. 100, 126 So. 2d 519 (1961)).
"I See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 102, at 710-12.
186 Larson, supra note 66, at 409.
187 Home Indem. Co. v. White, 154 Ga. App. 211, 267 S.E.2d 849 (1980).
168 See generally infra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
's Harrell v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 316 N.C. 191, 340 S.E.2d 111 (1986).
o Theorin v. Ditec Corp., 377 N.W.2d 437 (Minn. 1985).
e Frost v. Albright, 460 So. 2d 1125 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
192 The Ohio employer's burden of proof may require the use of the clear and convincing
evidence test. See D. McCowacK, McCohacK oN EvDENcE 959-61 (3d ed. 1984).
193 Courts will often give the intoxication defense a narrow scope in order to protect the
"security and families of all workers... ." Larson, supra note 66, at 417.
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essential that Ohio employers carefully examine the distinctions drawn
by courts from other jurisdictions and organize all available evidence
accordingly.
VI. TH ENPLOYEE'S DEFENSE
Once the employer has presented his intoxication defense, the burden
of rebuttal shifts to the employee.19 4 The employee must present compe-
tent factual evidence that he was either not intoxicated or under the
influence, or that his intoxication or being under the influence was not
the proximate cause of his injury.195
The easiest way to rebut the presumption that he was under the
influence is for the employee to show that he was taking a drug
prescribed by a physician. 196 If the prescription 197 is found to be legiti-
mate, compensation cannot be denied under section 4123.54(B).198
However, if the employee wishes to establish the fact that he was
legally sober at the time of the injury, he can attack the credibility of the
employer's witnesses, 199 or attack the accuracy of the biochemical test
19 Donofrio v. B.G.R. Inv. Corp., 10 Ohio Misc. 2d 25 (1983).
195 J. HARSius, supra note 12, at 102-03.
196 A physician is an individual who has been licensed by the state medical board to
engage in the practice of medicine. OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 4730.01(B)(Baldwin 1976). A
dentist is an individual who performs dental operations, diagnoses and treats diseases or
lesions of the human teeth or jaws, attempts to correct malpositions of jaw or teeth, and
constructs or supplies dentures, bridges or other appliances. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4715.01
(Baldwin 1982). Physicians and dentists are licensed and governed by separate boards. OHIo
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4731.05, 4731.08, 4715.01, 4715.02 (Baldwin 1982).
In the area of privilege, it has been determined that a dentist is not a physician, and thus,
is not privy to the physician-patient privilege. Belichick v. Belichick, 37 Ohio App. 2d 95,
99, 307 N.E.2d 270, 272 (1974).
Based on the heretofore mentioned facts, an employee whose injury is deemed to be
caused by his being under the influence of a controlled substance prescribed by a dentist
after the extraction of a tooth cannot recover workers' compensation. Such a result would be
unjust. In light of Oino REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.95 (Baldwin 1959) which requires the
workers' compensation legislation be construed liberally in favor of the employee, it is more
probable that a physician and dentist will not be viewed as mutually exclusive for the
purpose of § 4123.54(B).
197 A prescription is:
A written or oral order for a controlled substance for the use of a particular
person... given by a practitioner in the course of professional practice and in
accordance with the regulations promulgated by the director of the United States
drug enforcement administration pursuant to the federal drug abuse control laws.
Ouio REv. CODE AmN. § 3719.01(CC)(Baldwin 1977).
19' 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 307 (Baldwin).
199 See supra note 88.
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results presented by the employer.200 Furthermore, the Ohio Revised
Code provides that "section 4123.01 to 4123.94, inclusive, of the Ohio
Revised Code shall be liberally construed in favor of employees and
dependents of deceased employees."20 Thus, reasonable doubts in the
evidence may be resolved in favor the employee.
In addition to presenting his own test results, 20 2 the employee can
argue that the employer failed to establish the proper chain of evidence
with regard to the sample of bodily fluid removed from him for testing.20 3
It was decided that a North Dakota employer failed to prove that his
employee was intoxicated at the time of his injury where the coroner drew
a blood sample from the employee 32 hours after the accident and
delivered the sample in an open container to the hospital 1V2 hours
later.20 4 Once in the hospital laboratory the open containers were placed
in the refrigerator with many other samples overnight. The test results
were ruled incompetent evidence because the court, with justification,
questioned whether the blood, when tested, was in the same condition as
when taken from the employee's body.205
Another fact which should have concerned the North Dakota court was
that the specimen was allowed to sit and decay. Decay results in
increased blood alcohol levels to as much as 0.25% in a sample of a sober
person's blood.206 Refrigeration merely slows down the rate of decay. To
stop decay, a preservative, sodium flouride must be added to the sam-
ple.20 7
In addition to taking precautions for the physical care of the specimen,
the employer should obtain the specimen and test results in compliance
with the appropriate administrative procedures. For guidance in this
area, employers can consult Ohio's DWI statute. The statute provides
that when "a person submits to a blood test at the request of a police
officer... only a physician, a registered nurse, or a qualified technician
or chemist shall withdraw blood for the purpose of determining its
content. This limitation does not apply to the taking of breath or urine
200 Id. Chandler v. Suitt Constr. Co., 288 S.C. 503, 343 S.E.2d 633 (1986); Lankford v.
Redwing Carriers, Inc., 344 So. 2d 515 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977)(coroner withdrew blood
through a syringe that had been cleansed with alcohol-containing germicide). See also infra
notes 182-83, 187-88, 190-99 and accompanying text.
201 Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 4123.95 (Baldwin 1959).
202 In the litigation of drunk driving cases, the defendant may present evidence of a set
of test results which he independently obtained. Owo Rav. Coin ANN. § 4511.19 (Baldwin
1983).
203 Woosley v. Central Uniform Rental, 463 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971).
204 Erikson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 123 N.W.2d 292 (N.D.
1963).
205 Id. at 295.
206 L. TAYLOR, supra note 65, at 547.
207 Id.
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specimens." 208 The statute also provides that the specimen shall be
analyzed in accordance with the methods approved by the director of
health and by an individual who possesses a valid permit issued by the
director of health.20 9 Where an Alabama coroner withdrew a sample of
the employee's blood with a needle that had been cleansed in an
alcohol-containing germicide, the court held that only a physician,
registered nurse, or clinical laboratory technician was qualified to take a
blood sample for the purpose of analysis, thus the employer's intoxication
defense failed.210
It is also important that alcohol swabs are not used to cleanse the
employee's skin prior to taking a blood sample. These swabs often contain
70% alcohol and can cause a falsely elevated result.211 One study revealed
that a sober subject whose blood was drawn after his skin was cleansed
with alcohol had a blood alcohol level of 0.12% due to the contamina-
tion.212
In a case where the employer has complied with all the administrative
procedures and has established the appropriate foundation for his evi-
dence, the employee may attempt a more general attack upon the
accuracy of the test itself. Such a defense is costly because the employee
must present expert testimony on the inaccuracy of the testing method
utilized by the employer, the inaccuracy of the calibration of the equip-
ment utilized in the testing process, or the inability of the test to account
for the individual tolerances to alcohol or controlled substances. 2 13
Potentially, the most accurate test results are obtained by testing a
sample of the employee's blood for drugs or alcohol.214 The three methods
utilized are gas chromatography, enzymatic reaction, and alcohol sepa-
ration.21 5 The accuracy of these tests depends upon the precision of the
person performing the test and the proper preparation of the solutions
utilized in the testing process.216
The breathalyzer measures the amount of alcohol exhaled in vapor
from the lungs. 2 17 It has an error rate of 0.03%.218 The test results are
affected by any of the following factors: hyperventilation, hypoventila-
208 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (Baldwin 1983).
209 Id.
210 Lankford v. Redwing Carriers, Inc., 344 So. 2d 515 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977).
211 L. TAYLOR, supra note 65, at 544.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 65.
214 Id. at 539.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 447.
218 Id.
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tion, gender of subject, stress, subject's blood count, smoking, pulmonary
disease, and barometric pressure.219
Urine tests are relatively inexpensive with the most popular being the
EMIT test.220 Antibodies are added to urine specimens which turn a
characteristic color when certain drugs are present.2 21 Rarely, does the
test not detect a drug abuser. However, it often misidentifies a legal
over-the-counter medication as an illegal drug. 'Talse positives," or test
results which indicate one is under the influence of a controlled substance
when he is not, are created by the following medications: cold medications
are mistaken for amphetamines, cough syrups are mistaken for mor-
phine, and some antibiotics such as amoxicillin are misidentified as
cocaine. 222
Challenging the accuracy of the method of testing utilized by the
employer can be a powerful weapon in the hands of the employee whose
counsel is well versed in this area. The problem is that many attorneys do
not have the specialized knowledge necessary to effectively cross-exam-
ine the employer's experts on the issue.22 3
If the employee is unable to rebut the presumption of intoxication or
being under the influence, he can argue that his conduct was not the
proximate cause of his injury. Analogizing to the distinctions drawn in
other jurisdictions, the Ohio employee can defend his right to compensa-
tion by showing that his injury was proximately caused by a hazard of his
employment 224 or by a co-employee. 225
The employee may also argue that his employer is estopped from
raising an intoxication defense because he had knowledge of the em-
ployee's intoxication,226 supplied the liquor which caused the employee
to become intoxicated,2 27 or acquiesced in the employee's use of alco-
219 Id. at 448-54. See City of Columbus v. Day, 24 Ohio B. 263 (1986).
2'20 Rust, supra note 110, at 51, 52.
221 id.
222 id.
223 L. TAYLOR, supra note 65, at 542.
224 See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
225 See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
226 Frost v. Albright, 460 So. 2d 1128 (La. Ct. App. 1984)(employer not deemed to have
knowledge of employee's intoxication where employee told employer he had been drinking
the night before and a store clerk could tell employee was drunk). See also supra note 209
and accompanying text.
227 Beauchesne v. David London Co., 118 R.I. 651, 375 A.2d 920 (1977)(compensation
awarded where employee became intoxicated at office Christmas party and fell from
window); McCarthy v. W.C.A.B., 12 Cal. 3d 672, 527 P.2d 617, 117 Cal. Rptr. 65
(1974)(compensation awarded where employee drove home intoxicated from office party and
was involved in an accident).
But cf. § 4123.01(C)(3) where employee can waive his right to compensation by signing a
waiver before voluntarily engaging in an employer-sponsored recreation or fitness activity.
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hol.228 Knowledge on the part of the employer has been difficult to prove
in some jurisdictions. Knowledge of the employee's propensity to drink
will not usually estop an employer from raising an intoxication de-
fense.2 29 The underlying rationale is that the employer should not have to
ferret out each employee who violates the rule prohibiting the use of
alcohol or controlled substances on the job.23 0 In Davis v. C&M Tractor
Co.,231 the court refused to impute the employee's immediate supervisor's
knowledge of his intoxication to his employer.
VII. CONCLUSION
Establishing an intoxication defense under Ohio workers' compensa-
tion law will not be an easy task. The Ohio Legislature created a two
pronged test requiring the employer to show: (1) the employee was
intoxicated or under the influence of a non-prescription controlled sub-
stance when injured, and (2) the intoxication or being under the influence
was the proximate cause of the employee's injury.23 2
The language of section 4123.54(B) is consistent with the slight
majority of jurisdictions which place upon the employer an intermediate
level burden of proof. These jurisdictions require that the employer
present more than a blood alcohol or controlled substance level over the
DWI legal limit.2 3 3 The employer must prove, through observed evidence
and expert testimony, that based on the totality of circumstances, the
alcohol or controlled substance had such an effect on the employee's
nervous system, brain, or muscles as to impair his ability to perform his
job in a manner equivalent to an ordinary prudent person in full
possession of his faculties using reasonable care under similar circum-
stances.234
Once the employer proves that the employee was intoxicated or under
the influence, these jurisdictions require the employer to establish the
causal connection between the employee's conduct and his injury.2 3 5 The
burden lies somewhere between showing that the employee's intoxication
was the sole cause23 6 of his injury and that the employer's intoxication
1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 307 (Baldwin). In these situations, it would be of no consequence if
the employer supplied alcohol to his employee.
228 Frost, 460 So. 2d at 1128.
229 Davis v. C&M Tractor Co., 4 Ark. App. 34, 627 S.W.2d 561 (1982).
2-0 Id. at 37, 627 S.W. 2d at 564.
231 Id.
232 See § 4123.54(B) of 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 307 (Baldwin).
m See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
234 See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
2'3 See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
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was merely a contributing cause of the injury.237 Ultimately, Ohio
employers will be required to prove that the employee's intoxication or
being under the influence was so significant a cause of his injury that the
employee should be held legally responsible for his own harm.2 8
After the employer in these jurisdictions has presented his intoxication
defense, the employee must prove that he was not intoxicated or under
the influence of a non-presciption controlled substance 39 or that his
conduct was not the proximate cause of his injury24 0 to avoid being barred
from receiving reduced compensation. The new Ohio Supreme Court has
not yet spoken on the issue of whether compensation will be barred or
reduced in proportion to the degree of the employee's negligence. How-
ever, the language of section 4123.54(B) leaves many unanswered ques-
tions which will be resolved only after Ohio employers begin to assert
intoxication defenses before the Industrial Commission, and ultimately,
the new Ohio Supreme Court.241
TERRY A. DoNNER
2 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
In its original state, the Senate passed an exclusion from the definition of compensable
injury which required that the employee's intoxication or being under the influence of a
controlled substance be merely a contributing cause of his injury or disability. J. HARMs,
supra note 1, at 102.
However, the enacted version now requires that the employee's injury be proximately
caused by his intoxication or being under the influence of a non-prescription controlled
substance. Section 4123.54(B) of 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 307 (Baldwin).
238 See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
29 See supra notes 196-13 and accompanying text.
240 See supra notes 180-91 and accompanying text.
241 "Historically, the Ohio Supreme Court has not been known as innovative or creative.
The leading edge of the law in the state has, as in most others, long been legislative rather
than judicial, and the court has accepted a role of self-restraint vis-a-vis the General
Assembly." Goostree, supra note 51, at 6.
Exercising self-restraint, the court has been reluctant to substitute judicial opinion for
the wisdom of the Ohio Legislature. However, the Ohio Supreme Court under the leadership
of Chief Justice Celebrezze aroused public controversy by abruptly departing from the
court's traditionally deferential posture in the area of workers' compensation. Id.
Based upon Chief Justice Moyer's court of appeals decisions which "fit well within the
Ohio Supreme Court's historical context of legislative deference, self-restraint, and strict
construction of both statutes and administrative regulations," it is expected that the new
court will revert back to its historical decisional pattern. Id. at 8.
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